In a series of cases decided over the last few years, the European Court of Human Rights has been increasingly vindicating artistic freedom. It has been expanding the meaning of 'satire' as a form of art; excluding the protection of religious sensibilities from the scope of Article 9; and gradually referring to the defence of 'fiction' in literary cases. Yet a more careful analysis of the Court's case law does not suggest that art holds a privileged status among other forms of expression. It rather suggests that the Court, albeit tacitly, operates a certain hierarchy of values: on the one hand, by privileging liberal-and secular-values and, on the other, by being mindful to preserve the States' margin of appreciation in issues touching upon public morality and public order. In this article I submit that the Court could substantially benefit from an explicit consideration of defences for artists and writers.
INTRODUCTION
Since its first judgment in 1959 or, more accurately, since the late 1990s when its case law started growing, 1 the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or 'the Court') has been confronted with a vast number of cases related to various human rights violations. From these cases, the ones that are primarily based on claims of violation of Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights 2 (ECHR or 'the -also symbolic-form of expression, suffering from definition problems more than any other form. 13 It is also, however, one that is historically and philosophically free of constraints:
14 this is precisely why many constitutional traditions distinguish it from other forms of expression, providing for separate, unqualified, protection. 15 Yet since art under the Convention 16 -like any other form of expression-is subject not only to restrictions, 17 but also to duties and responsibilities, 18 the question of possible 'defences' applicable to artistic expression remains somehow ambiguous. The second reason is the expertise required of the Court in relation to conflicts of rights in cases concerning artistic expression. In fact, the Court has developed case law on 'artistic controversies' far more extensively than any other mechanism of regional human rights protection. As an indication only, it may be noted that, as against the 29 cases that have reached the Court and the former Commission (and that are analysed in this article), only one such case has reached the Human Rights Committee, 19 one the Inter-American Court 20 and none the African Commission and Court or the Court of Justice of the European Union. 21 In the cases that do come before the Court, a particularly heavy burden falls upon the shoulders of the Judges. On the one hand, they are compelled to decide on these thorny issues of public morals and religious convictions, for which a consensus is arguably impossible to be found, making recourse to the margin of appreciation inevitable. 22 On the other hand, they are confronted by larger dilemmas that go way beyond concerns of a purely legal nature, such as the resolution of conflicts between individual and group rights 23 and the accommodation of ethno-religious diversity. 24 These questions usually give rise to the particularly challenging exercise of balancing between competing rights and values, pertaining to questions ultimately ethical, if not also political.
The present article does not consider all cases touching upon the arts, 25 but confines itself to those cases that fall within the ambit of Article 10 and are directly related to artistic freedom. It argues that the case law of the Court, taken as a whole, does not support a conclusion that the arts hold a privileged status among other forms of expression, nor that there is now an articulate methodology to consider conflicts between artistic freedom and the rights of others. In fact, the position of the Court has not evolved in the sense of giving more weight to artistic freedom than to other values, except insofar the Court has excluded religious sensibilities from the protective scope of Article 9 when clashing with Article 10.
26 And yet certain trends in the case law of the Court, visible especially in judgments after 2005 and in dissenting opinions, support the suggestion that, in the context of European democratic societies, artists and writers could rely on defences specifically adapted to them. This article submits that the Court could substantially benefit from explicitly recognizing and categorizing these defences, particularly the emerging defence of 'fiction'. It further suggests that such recognition could, eventually, contribute to handling the relevant cases in a more coherent way. 22 This number is minimal compared to the enormous judicial output of the Court. It is equally minimal compared to the long list of blasphemous, transgressive, obscene, offensive and other scandalous artworks and novels that have been published. 29 Additionally, the arguably two most famous controversies of the last decades concerning the limits of artistic expression were both missed opportunities for Strasbourg. The first is the case of the Satanic Verses: when the storm over this novel broke in 1989, Salman Rushdie became a headhunted author worth a one million dollars fatwa.
30 A Muslim applicant brought the case to Strasbourg as a case of blasphemy against the Islamic religion. The Commission examined the case only briefly before finding the complaint inadmissible ratione materiae for the reasons discussed in Section 3 of this article. 31 The second is the 
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(ii) Diversity in the content of cases and a variety of respondent states Certainly in many cases values at stake overlap, while the claims brought before the Court are not necessarily identical to the ones brought before the domestic courts. Yet a rough categorization reveals that the 'old' and the 'new' Court's case law are strikingly different not only in terms of number of applications lodged, but also in terms of the nature of the disputes.
Since the end of the 1990s, literature and political cartoons (that is, arts based on the medium of speech) have been gradually outweighing visual arts and films, 33 while cases related to personality rights, offence and incitement to hatred have been steadily gaining terrain. 34 At least three reasons can be identified for this shift. First, there is the fact that conflicts of rights involving personal interests, particularly concerning the 'rights of others', have multiplied in the last years. This development in human rights law, intrinsically linked to the expansion of the so-called 'third-effect party', has resulted in many infringements previously seen as state restrictions on the ground of 'public order' or 'public morality' being now brought to Strasbourg from the claimants' perspective-and therefore being tackled as conflicts of rights. 35 Hence, since the end of 1990s, when applications against Turkey multiplied, 44 the case law of the Court on Article 10 seems slightly altered in terms of outcome, with extremely few cases against Turkey amounting to non-violations of Article 10 (usually on significant incitement to hatred issues) and this only after pronounced disagreements within the Court. 45 The presence or absence of particular states among the list of 'violators' of Article 10 in artistic freedom cases, however, also suggests that the States Parties' records in censorship and artistic expression matters that is apparent from other sources is not necessarily reflected in the ECtHR's case law. In fact, apart from Turkey, all other States are represented with only one or two cases, 46 while some forms of art, such as music and comics, remain virtually absent from this jurisprudence-despite relevant ) are entirely absent from the list of 'violators'. More surprisingly, Russia, the State that has perhaps the largest record of freedom of expression restrictions in the context of the Council of Europe 51 with attacks against dissident views a common phenomenon, 52 is only marginally represented in cases concerning artistic freedom, namely with two pending cases that will be discussed in Section 3(B) below.
RELIGIOUS OFFENCE AND PUBLIC MORALITY
BEFORE THE COURT The case law of the Court with respect to blasphemy laws, and in other contexts in which offence had been caused to sensibilities, was quite inconsistent until the late 1990s. This inconsistency remains difficult to comprehend without referring first to the two-fold system of adjudication functioning in Strasbourg prior 1998.
A. Disagreements Between the Court and the Commission until the Late 1990s
Throughout its existence, the Commission held a rather positive view of artistic freedom. In a landmark case, concerning three large canvases painted by the Swiss artist Josef Felix Müller (representing, among other things, bestiophilia) 53 the Commission clarified that 'it does not fall upon [it] to issue a value judgment on the possible artistic quality of this or that work'. 54 In another Swiss case decided the year before the Müller case, concerning a well-known graffiti artist, Naegeli, who complained of not being able to create freely on the properties of others, 55 the Commission again held an 'art-positive' view. One of Naegeli's arguments was that the law on the protection of property against damage did not apply in his case, since the buildings that he had bombed-sprayed had not been damaged but, on the contrary, augmented in value. 56 Although the Commissioners did not go as far as to endorse Mr Naegeli's claim, they did consider the question of a potentially different treatment of the arts an 'open-ended' one; 57 a view that is quite progressive, given that until today the movement for the decriminalization of graffiti is a controversial one.
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It is only the first case decided by the Commission, in 1982, that appears truly problematic. 59 In this case, known as the Gay News case, it fell first to the Commissioners to decide whether Christian beliefs (protected against blasphemy until 2008 in the UK) were injured by an allegedly 'blasphemous' poem published in a gay magazine entitled 'The Love that Dares to Speak its Name'. Deciding that a claim under Article 10 was inadmissible, the Commission ruled against the poet's artistic freedom, referring to the UK's leeway to define the offence of blasphemy in its domestic laws, provided that it respects the principle of proportionality. 60 After that, however, in all cases in which it was required to answer whether religious sensibilities fall within the scope of protection of Article 9 of the Convention, the Commission replied in the negative. Shortly after the Gay News case, the Commission decided the Scientology case, concerning an action against a theology professor who had called Scientology the 'cholera' of spiritual life. Although based on Article 9 of the Convention, the case presented an opportunity for the Commission to highlight that criticism of religious beliefs is legitimate, unless it reaches such a level 'that it might endanger freedom of religion and . . . [engages] State responsibility'.
61 Consistent with its views in another Article 9 case, it equally dismissed the claim of a Muslim applicant, who brought blasphemy charges against Salman Rushdie.
62 The complaint this time was that English law failed to protect the religion of the applicant 'against abuse or scurrilous attacks'. Once more, the Commission showed an unwillingness to rule that Article 9 of the Convention required that laws should be extended so as to protect a religion from offence and rejected the complaint as incompatible ratione materiae with the Convention. 63 At that point, it would, presumably, have also found the UK blasphemy laws incompatible with protection of religious freedom: in fact, until its merging with the Court, the Commission showed consistency in excluding all religious sensibilities from the Convention, stating unequivocally that the 'members of a religious community must tolerate and accept the denial by others of their religious beliefs'. 64 In the much discussed case of Otto-Preminger-Institut v Austria, the Courts decided that the seizure of the blasphemous film was in breach of the Convention, and also highlighted that 'satirical texts or films can normally not be completely prohibited even if some restrictions concerning minors or people unaware of the contents may be possible', 65 while in Wingrove, in which the UK refused to grant a cinematographic visa to a short (18 minute) video entitled 'Visions of Ecstasy', it agreed with the video artist that his work had been unduly censored. 66 At the same time, the case law of the Court was significantly more conservative. In the new millennium, the Court seems to be attempting to contextualize cases of offence to religious sensibilities. The understanding of religious freedom seems to be somehow more 'qualitative', and there is an obvious shift towards the exclusion of the protection of sensibilities. The first time that this point was raised in the context of a dispute is by three dissenting Judges in _ I.A. v Turkey (2005): 74 they not only addressed the fact that the incriminated passages were but 'a few sentences' of the whole book, but noted, in addition that 'nobody is ever obliged to buy or read a novel, and those who do so are entitled to seek redress in the courts for anything they consider blasphemous and repugnant to their faith' and that 'it is quite a different matter for the prosecuting authorities to institute criminal proceedings against a publisher of their own motion in the name of "God, the Religion, the Prophet and the Holy Book" . . . a democratic society is not a theocratic society'. 75 One year later, the point was made explicit by the Court, in three cases concerning scientific and academic freedom (Aydin Tatlav v fact that he is an artist or that a work is a painting in order to escape liability for insulting others,' 87 while the other two dissenting Judges went as far as arguing that 'committed' art (art engagé) should be limited when it 'interferes excessively with the rights of others'. 88 The shift towards the exclusion of sensibilities from the protective scope of Article 9 is undoubtedly in line with the parallel international developments. Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, in 2005, the Danish Cartoons controversy caused shock on an unprecedented scale not only Denmark, but also the EU, the Council of Europe and the whole international community, to the point of a veritable 'global crisis'. 89 All of a sudden, the Satanic verses memories revived, and freedom of expression became a battleground in the international arena. On the one side, the advocates of extremist liberal views: those who, ignoring the reality of migration, and the multicultural composition of European capitals, would find in the 'right to freedom of expression' (and the subsequent setting aside of offence to religious beliefs) useful arguments to impose 'migrant unfriendly' views, or even, to circumvent anti-hate speech legislation.
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On the other side, the advocates of extremist religious views and those who, equally unfairly, would find in the right to protect a religion a reason to oppose the West and show 'dislike' towards its liberal values. religions' campaigns at the United Nations level and to confirm that groups and individuals should be protected only against hatred and incitement to violence and discrimination according to the current interpretation of the international human rights standards. 93 It would have been practically impossible for the Court to maintain views such as those expressed in Wingrove and Otto-Preminger accepting the legitimacy of state action to punish offence to religion, especially since it is precisely these two judgements that have been exploited by blasphemy law advocates to campaign in favour of the prohibition of 'defamation of religions'. 94 Since _ I.A. and Bildender there have been no other judgments of the Court concerning specifically artistic freedom and offence to religious sensibilities. Further, some cases that could have eventually shed more light to these questions have been considered inadmissible in accordance with Article 27 of the Convention. 95 The Court, however, will have to face the question of 'conflict' between arts and religions in the two pending cases against Russia: Samodurov and Vasilovskaya 96 and Alekhina and Others.
97 Although religious sensibilities are not addressed explicitly in these cases, 98 it may be legitimately presumed that the Court will show little willingness to accept that offences against religious prescripts are justified on the basis of the Russian 'incitement to hatred' laws. First, because of the obvious breach of the proportionality test 99 religions and gratuitously offensive expression. 100 Secondly, because, as explained above, the Court generally seems to be privileging a rather secular understanding of European 'democratic societies', until now, the margin of appreciation doctrine has been used in such a way as not to accommodate minority religious beliefs. 101 Thirdly, because the Court is not a regional organ that functions in a sphere of isolation: it is a dynamic judicial organ, interpreting the Convention as a 'living instrument', and committed to taking into account more general trends in international law-especially those arising within the Council of Europe. Unlike some other international instruments, however, the European Convention has no specific provision on hate speech cultural rights 102 or, a fortiori, on minority rights: questions related to minority sensibilities and cultural matters are therefore only implicitly tackled in the Convention. And yet since the Court is considered to be the leading human rights 'standard-setting' organ in Europe, its case law is highly influential. As pointed by the dissenting Judges in Vallianatos, albeit in a different context, judgments should be 'in tune' with such general trends, especially the most recent relevant regional instruments. 103 The trend to interpret the laws on incitement to hatred in a way that excludes the protection of sensibilities, however, has been visible not only at a United Nations level, 104 but first and foremost within the EU and the Council of Europe. 
EXISTING DEFENCES
Article 10 of the Convention does not provide explicitly for any 'defences'-as is the case in some constitutional traditions. 106 Nor does it make any categorization between the different types and forms of expression protected. It is the Court that has established different levels of protection for different categories of speech (such as political, commercial or artistic speech), 107 and it is also the Court that has developed a specific toolkit to interpret the-quite vaguely formulated-restrictions contained in Article 10 paragraph 2, in order to assess whether an interference is 'necessary in a democratic society'. Hence, as part of the so-called 'three-part test', the Court generally uses the-rather broad-Handyside formula 108 and general principles such as the need for 'pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness'. 109 Nevertheless, its methodological approach in freedom of expression cases has significantly evolved over time. In fact, to decide the limits of permissible 'offence' in freedom of speech cases, the Court is now increasingly taking into account the context of the particular case, 110 including a thorough consideration of civil and criminal law defences available to defendants in freedom of expression cases. 111 This said, it may be possible to discern certain defences, which could be, or have already been, applied in artistic freedom cases.
A. Political Arts and the Contribution to the Public Debate
In one of the first cases that came to the attention of the Court after its merging with the Commission, Karataş v Turkey (1999), the Court found a violation concerning a pro-Kurdish anthology of poems that had been censored by the Turkish authorities Turkey for disseminating separatist propaganda. 112 The Court recognized that the artistic nature of the work in question, which 'addressed, in addition, only a minority of readers who are sensitive', 113 was a defence against the interference, 114 and this despite the opposite finding of the Commission. 115 Hence, in contrast to other cases decided on the same day, 116 the Court ruled in favour of Mr Karataş's poems (by 12 votes to five), 117 and noted in particular their 'obvious political dimension' and their 'colourful imagery' which 'expressed deep-rooted discontent with the lot of the population of Kurdish origin in Turkey'. 118 Similarly, in Arslan v Turkey
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and Başkaya and Okçuo glu v Turkey, 120 the Court decided on the same day that the confiscation of historical and academic books respectively under Turkish anti-terrorism law constituted violations of Article 10. As the Court observed in Arslan v Turkey, public expression of views through literary works, such as books, 'rather than the mass media' may indicate the absence of a need by the State to suppress their content.
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B. Precautions Taken in Artistic and Cultural Events
The second defence which, albeit unsystematically, has been present since the early case law of the Court, seems to be the precautions taken on the occasion of artistic and cultural events. In fact, in most decisions and judgments, the Court has already made clear that 'offence to one's beliefs that may result in a breach of the Convention cannot occur against individuals who have willingly submitted themselves to reading or visualizing an offensive work'-therefore implying that a prohibition should aim at protecting only those who do not want to expose themselves to the incriminated artistic creation or literature work. It may be deduced that for the Court it is of crucial importance whether precautions are taken, so that vulnerable individuals-most notably, minors, or generally speaking a young audience-are protected from being exposed to what one might consider offensive. The element of precaution was put forward by the Court in Müller 122 and in the dissenting opinion in the case of 
Otto-Preminger,
123 as well as in virtually all obscenity cases, including V.D. and C.G. v France (2006) , 124 concerning the classification of the French film 'Baise-moi'. The Commission's view was the same in a case involving an experimental form of art, the so-called 'cadaver' art, 125 in which the sculpture in question consisted of frozen human foetuses, exhibited hanging and entitled 'Human Earings'. 126 The work, made by Rick Gibson, was removed on the grounds of the common law offence of outraging public decency, precisely because the exhibition was in the context of a show open to the general public and attracting a large number of spectators.
EMERGING DEFENCES
Despite the lack of any systematic use, it may be legitimately argued that the defence of 'fiction' is emerging in the Court's jurisprudence. Other defences, such as humour and satire, hold an equally important role, but as yet are used rather inconsistently.
A. Humour, Satire and Parody
The Court has ruled without any hesitation that artistic freedom embraces satire and political humour. Satire in the eyes of the Strasbourg Judges has the largest possible meaning since it is not only 'a form of artistic expression', but also 'a social commentary . . . which, naturally aims to provoke and agitate'.
127 Political humour and humour that contributes to the public debate hold a privileged status, 128 especially in the light of values as important as the protection of minors. 129 In Kuli s and R o_ zycki the poor quality of their crisps, the Court agreed with the applicants that their freedom of expression had been unduly infringed, given that Star Foods' campaign 'used slogans referring . . . to sexual and cultural behaviour, in a manner scarcely appropriate for children' and found that 'the style of the applicants' expression was motivated by 'the type of slogans to which they were reacting'. 131 This observation does not necessarily require that the Court appreciate all sorts of humour equally, not even political cartoons. 132 Hence, on the one hand, humour that is aimed at political personas and public officials is virtually always welcome by the Court. 133 On the other hand, humour destined to mock complex or controversial situations and events, such as the rise of extremism, terrorism and extreme-right wing speech, is a much more problematic form of expression. The first case indicating that humour and satire is not a crystallized defence is the case of Leroy v France.
134 The case concerned a small cartoon mocking of the 9/11 attacks accompanied by a caption paraphrasing Nike's advertising slogan: 'We have all dreamt of it . . . Hamas did it', published in a weekly newspaper in the Basque country only two days after the attacks. Unlike the domestic courts, which considered the drawing a threat to France's national security because of its support for terrorism ('apologie du terrorisme'), 135 the Court attempted to assess whether a fair balance had been observed between the individual right to freedom of expression and the interest of public order, as well as 'the legitimate right of a democratic society to protect itself against the actions of terrorist organizations'. 136 Albeit reiterating the importance of satire and observing that the 'inherent language of cartoons is a form of artistic expression . . . by definition provocative', 137 the Court focused on the wording of the cartoon caption which, in the view of the Court, indicated that the applicant expressed his moral solidarity with the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks, therefore 'judging favourably the violence against millions of civilians'. 138 distribute for his election campaign leaflets and posters with captions such as 'US attacks: it's the couscous clan'. The Court agreed with the Belgian authorities that the language employed by the applicant incited discrimination and hatred and was wilfully degrading, finding that the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify the interference in this case were relevant and sufficient, 'given the pressing social need to protect public order and the rights of others, i.e. the immigrant community'. 140 B. Fiction in the Case of Literature and Poetry Fiction seems to be an emerging defence increasingly discussed within the Court. In fact, the Court has never explicitly discussed fiction as a 'defence' for writers and poets, but has preferred to base its judgments on the traditional distinction between 'assertion of facts' and 'value judgements'. 141 The distinct function of the artwork as a product of fiction is taken into account for the first time only in 2005 in Alınak v Turkey. 142 The incriminated novel, entitled 'The Heat of Şiro', described the massacre that took place in a village close to Sırnak, a Kurdish province in south-eastern Turkey near to the Iraqi-Syrian borders. Shortly after its publication in 1997 copies of the novel were seized, since, according to the State Security Court which ordered the seizure, it 'attribut[ed] extremely disgusting acts to the security forces, identified with names and rank, incited people to hatred and hostility by making distinctions between Turkish citizens based on grounds of their ethnic or regional identity'. 143 Although the facts described in the book were based on real facts, the Court recognized that there should be a privileged treatment of freedom of literature precisely because of the 'fiction defence', observing that, although the book contained passages that '[t]aken literally . . . might be construed as inciting readers to hatred, revolt and the use of violence, . . . the medium used by the applicant was a novel, a form of artistic expression that appeals to a relatively narrow public compared to, for example, the mass media.' 144 The Court explicitly recognized, unanimously, that 'the impugned book is a novel classified as fiction, albeit purportedly based on real events'. 145 The Court's position is reiterated in Jel sevar and Others v Slovenia. 146 The applicants, considering that a self-published book available to the public contained depictions of personalities resembling their private and family life, lodged a complaint with the Court under Article 8 of the Convention for violation of their personality rights. The Court did not confine itself to the usual balancing exercise: it explicitly referred to literature as 'fiction', noting that 'the book at issue was written not as a biography but as a work of fiction and, as such, would not be understood by most readers as portraying real people'. 147 Interestingly, the Court's view in Jel sevar is similar to that of the German Federal Constitutional Court in the cases of Mephisto and Esra-both well known for the impressive findings on the importance of artistic and literary freedom. 148 Yet there are no indications that these 'art-positive' findings will be repeated in future cases involving artistic freedom. First, in more challenging cases, the Court seems to be considerably more reluctant to repeat its own findings. In Lindon v France, 149 the majority of the Grand Chamber did not show the same sensibility to fiction. 150 The case concerned the publication of a novel entitled The Trial of JeanMarie Le Pen, which was based on the hypothetical trial of the leader of the French party Front National (Ronald Blistier). In the novel, Blistier commits a racist crime influenced by Le Pen's extreme right-wing ideas and, interestingly, the story, albeit fictitious, is inspired by similar events. After publication the book was not seized; the writer, however, along with the book's publisher and the director of the French newspaper 'Liberation'-which had reproduced passages from the book along with a petition signed by 97 writers in favour of Lindon-were all prosecuted for defamation. The Court admits that the novel 'was inspired by real events but adds fictional elements'. 151 However, instead of reiterating its findings in Alinak, it preferred to maintain its previous views on distinguishing between facts and value judgments. Hence, despite its initial finding with respect to the 'defence' of the contribution to the public debate and the explicit affirmation that 'the limits of acceptable criticism are wider as regards a politician', 152 the Judges took the novel to the letter, dismissing any reference to fiction.
du Chaos'. The property was used by various artists as an exhibition space for collective art projects and was characterized by the local artistic community as a 'contemporary art museum', receiving thousands of visitors every year. More than three thousand paintings and construction works were part of it, including drawings of 'skulls and salamanders' on the external walls of the Demeure. Following a largely mediatized controversy, the French courts found the artist criminally liable for breaching the provisions of the French Planning Code (Code de l'urbanisme) and requested the restoration of the premises to 'their previous state'. Without examining the eventual contribution of the Demeure to the artistic and cultural life of the community, the domestic courts considered that whether the premises 'should be characterised as a work of art was not for the criminal court to decide'. The Court agreed, with no further discussion. Finding that the planning regulations in question 'constituted measures that were necessary in a democratic society for the prevention of disorder, which meant ensuring the protection of the common good and respect for the collective intent as expressed in planning choices', it rejected the applicant's Article 10 complaint. 155 Furthermore, in Kartunnen, concerning a Finish artist (and University lecturer) who, in a gallery opening entitled 'Virgin-Whore Church', exhibited web-porn material directly downloaded from the Internet to 'to encourage discussion and raise awareness of how widespread and easily accessible child pornography was', 156 the Court did not even find the artistic freedom claim relevant. In the cas d'espèce, the domestic authorities seized Kartunnen's photographs and closed down the exhibition on the grounds of the domestic anti-obscenity criminal law, that criminalizes, inter alia, the manufacturing and distribution of sexually obscene pictures or visual recordings depicting children, violence or bestiality. 157 Admitting that 'conceptions of sexual morality have changed in recent years', and noting that the domestic courts had 'acknowledged the applicant's good intentions', 158 the Court did not go as far as affirming that the specific works in question were protected as a form of artistic expression, as the applicant claimed.
159 Yet in Müller, decided 30 years earlier, a case in which the bestiality in the representations in the paintings had been incriminated under the-somewhat similar, if not more rigid-Swiss criminal law, 160 the Court, albeit finding the restriction legitimate, did not object to the nature of the disputed reason that the property was in a position of joint visibility with edifices in the French secondary list of historical buildings (a church and a manor house). paintings as 'artworks', and considered the case admissible, allowing at least for the balancing exercise to take place. 161 In light of the above, other judgments of the Court, such as Akdaş, 162 which, for some authors, marked the beginning of a new era in the protection of artistic freedom, 163 should be interpreted more cautiously. Indeed, one can only rejoice at the recognition of a violation of Article 10 vindicating the freedom of the arts over the seizure and destruction of the novel by the Turkish authorities. Yet the censored work was not one of a marginal artist (as in Wingrove for instance), nor even of a politically 'engaged' one (as in Bildender-Kunstler). Despite its undisputable scandalous content (with explicit scenes of sexual intercourse and sadomasochism) when first published a century ago, the 'Eleven Hundred Virgins' was written by Apollinaire-a classic author whose work is now considered part of the European literary heritage to which the Council of Europe attributes major importance. 164 It is, therefore, fairly evident that the Court could not have possibly envisaged the option to 'prevent public access to a particular language . . . to a work contained in the European literary heritage' 165 -not even to protect the so cherished margin of appreciation of the respondent State.
THE SPECIFICITY OF THE ARTS
The Court could potentially take into account the distinct nature of the arts as a separate defence. The reason is certainly neither that art is an 'unlimited freedom', nor that artists are excluded from duties and responsibilities. It is rather that the Court should remain consistent with its own findings. At least two types of findings support the view that the Court is already taking into account the specificity of the arts as a defence.
The first is the largo sensu perception of what constitutes 'art'. In fact, the Court has never engaged in philosophical discussions on the definition of 'art' 166 or taken into consideration any qualifying conditions for this freedom to be invoked. 167 Over the last few years, however, this already broad perception seems to be expanding dramatically, with the Court referring to 'artistic freedom' even when the slightest hint of creative expression appears in the facts of the case. For instance, in Alves da Silva v Portugal, concerning a Portuguese journalist who had made a puppet to lampoon the attitude of the mayor of his native village, the Court explicitly affirmed that the applicant was covered by the protection of the freedom of satire as a form of art, since the applicant wished to express himself in a way 'quite clearly satirical in nature'. 168 Similarly, in Tat ar and F aber v Hungary, it accepted that expressions such as exposing dirty clothing on the fence surrounding the Hungarian parliament 'qualif[ied] as artistic and political', since the purpose was to complain about the political crisis in the country. 169 Also, in Welsh and Silva Canha v Portugal, 170 with respect to the condemnation of two journalists for having written a press article revealing money scandals, the Court stressed the claimants satirical approach, and noted that there was a breach of their 'artistic freedom'-remarkably noting that 'one needs to examine very carefully any interference with the rights of an artist -or any person who wishes to express themselves in this way'. 171 In the case of Eon v France, also decided in 2013, 172 and concerning an individual who raised a small placard reading 'get lost, you sad prick' when the French President Sarkozy passed nearby, once more the Court made allusion to satire, noting, as in Welsh and Silva Canha, that 'any interference with the right of an artist -or anyone else -to use this means of expression should be examined with particular care'. 173 The same findings were repeated in Murat Vural v Turkey in 2014, concerning an individual who, 'equipped with a tin of paint, paint thinner and a ladder', 174 poured paint on several statutes of Atatürk situated in the public space.
The second finding is the defensive function of the arts when discussing pornography cases. In fact, the Court has never explicitly clarified where exactly is situated the line between pornography and 'obscene art'. 176 When the opportunity arose in the V.D. and C.G. case, it preferred to remain silent, merely implying that the film had some artistic merit 177 before observing that it 'essentially constituted explicit scenes of violence and sex'. 178 Yet, in pornography cases in which the applicants claimed an infringement of their 'artistic freedom' the Court dismissed the relevant claims for the simple reason that 'this is not art'. For instance, in Perrin, 179 the applicant was convicted and sentenced by the UK courts to 30 months imprisonment for maintaining a pornographic website accessible only to subscribers. The Court found the prison sentence 'clearly proportionate', since, first, the applicant did not manage to take any precautions on accessibility with respect to age limit, leaving the page 'freely available to anyone surfing the Internet', 180 and, secondly, 'the purpose of the present expression was purely commercial and there [was] no suggestion that it contributed to any public debate on a matter of public interest or that it was of any artistic merit'. 181 In fact, negating the quality of an artwork as such has been an exception throughout the case law of the Court. To our knowledge, it has happened only once, when Judge Loucaïdes argued that Otto Muhl's disputed painting in Bildender 'was not art' but rather 'a senseless, disgusting combination of lewd images whose only effect is to debase, insult and ridicule each and every person portrayed'. 182 Even in this case, which split the Court, the other two dissenting judges, Spielmann and Jebens, showed some understanding of the role of the arts in a society, noting that 'the painting was not intended to portray reality' and that it is not the task of a Court to perform quality controls 'or to differentiate between "superior" and "inferior" or "good" and "bad"'. 183 
CONCLUSION
The Court has given only a handful of judgments on artistic freedom. Certainly no general conclusions can be drawn, since matters pertaining to self censorship and the socio-economic conditions of the arts go far beyond the scope of this study. The minimal number of cases before the Court, however, suggests that arts either suffer from State interference relatively less frequently than other forms of expression or that the highest courts of the States Parties generally maintain human rights standards.
Nevertheless, some comments may be made. On its face, it seems that after 2005 the Court has taken a positive stance towards the arts. Undoubtedly, in the few cases it has decided, the Court has come up with remarkably 'art positive' findings, including expanding its perception of what constitutes 'art', although abstaining from giving any formal definition of the concept; finding Article 10 violations in all artistic freedom cases involving Turkey; tending to outweigh offence to religious sensibilities for the sake of artistic expression; and hailing the value of the European cultural heritage. In addition, at least since 2008, the Court has implied that writers and poets may rely on certain defences-such as the satirical nature of the artwork in question; precautions in the case of exhibitions, film screenings and other artistic events; and also, arguably, fiction, in the case of literary works. Most noteworthy, the Court has explicitly referred to fiction as a defence for the author in Jel sevar (2014). The rationale in this admissibility decision is exceptional, reminding us of the 'art-protective' phraseology of the German Constitutional Court's rulings in Mephisto and Esra.
At the same time, however, there are at least two grounds for criticism of the Court's methodology. First, the Court remains hesitant to repeat its positive findings, especially in more challenging cases. The fact that in Leroy (2008), Erhmann (2011) and Kartunnen (2011) the Court has held 'art-negative' views, both in terms of rationale and outcome, weighs in this sense more heavily than the finding of Article 10 violations in cases against Turkey, such as Akdaş. Secondly, the fact that the aforementioned defences (satire, precautions and fiction) have never been explicitly formulated, with the Court still showing its preference towards the rather contextual defence of the 'contribution to the public debate'.
Three steps ought to be taken. First, to ensure that freedom of artistic expression, as any other form of expression, will continue to be respected in situations of severe censorship in those States Parties to the Convention that are repeatedly repressing the freedom of expression of dissident and minority views. The Court should continue maintaining human rights standards, dismissing States' arguments aiming at minimizing pluralism. Secondly, to categorize existing and emerging Article 10 defences as part of a methodology of balancing between competing interests. The instigation of a more operational approach could be efficient for the Court in cases related to freedom of expression, particularly when the latter conflicts with personality rights and incitement to hatred-or in cases in which a lack of consensus unavoidably leads the Court to apply a wide margin of appreciation. Thirdly, by progressively developing a theory on positive obligations stemming from the right to artistic freedom, so as to empower the right of the public to access culture, including minority cultures. In questions pertaining to hate speech and incitement to hatred, the Court could also take into account, contemporary soft law developments as well as instruments such as the Camden Principles 184 and the Rabat Plan of Action. 185 In this way, it would ascertain its authority as a mechanism of protection not only for human rights, but also for cultural human rights.
